In this paper, we investigate informational asymmetries in the Colonel Blotto game, a game-theoretic model of competitive resource allocation between two players over a set of battlefields. The battlefield valuations are subject to randomness. One of the two players knows the valuations with certainty. The other knows only a distribution on the battlefield realizations. However, the informed player has fewer resources to allocate. We characterize unique equilibrium payoffs in a two battlefield setup of the Colonel Blotto game. We then focus on a three battlefield setup in the General Lotto game, a popular variant of the Colonel Blotto game. We characterize unique equilibrium payoffs and quantify the value of informationthe difference in equilibrium payoff between the asymmetric information game and complete information game. Though information can never give a weaker player the competitive advantage when there are only two battlefields, three battlefields offers sufficient complexity such that it is possible.
I. INTRODUCTION
In adversarial interactions, informational asymmetries may provide an advantage to one competitor over the other. Adversarial contests appear in a wide range of applications, such as political campaigns [2] , [3] , security of cyberphysical systems [4] , and competitive advertising [5] . Rigorous studies on the interplay between asymmetric information and strategic decision-making in adversarial settings has received attention in the recent literature [6] , [7] . Though these works analyze general zero-sum game settings, another popular framework for analyzing such contests is the Colonel Blotto game. Two players strategically allocate their limited resources over a finite set of battlefields. A player secures a battlefield if it has allocated more resources to it than the opponent. Each player aims to secure as many battlefields as possible. The goal of the present paper is to quantify the performance improvements one player in the Blotto game may experience when it possesses system-level information while its opponent does not.
Though simply posed, the Colonel Blotto game features highly complex strategies. The established literature on the Colonel Blotto game and its variants primarily focuses on characterizing mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, due to nonexistence of pure equilibria in most cases of interest. First introduced by Borel in 1921 [8] , researchers have incre-There recently has been renewed interest in the Colonel Blotto game, along with its many variants and extensions [3] , [11] - [15] . Notably, results for heterogeneous battlefield valuations have appeared in Colonel Blotto as well as the General Lotto variant, which admits a more tractable analysis [13] , [14] . Blotto games have also received attention in engineering application areas such as the security of cyberphysical systems [4] and the formation of large-scale networks [16] , [17] . The vast majority of these studies assume the players have complete information about the opposing player's resource budget and the values of each battlefield.
Few works have considered the Blotto or Lotto game with incomplete information. In [18] , the authors study a Blotto game in which players have incomplete information about the other's resource budgets. In [19] , the players are subject to incomplete information about the battlefield valuations. In both of these works, all players are equally uninformed about the parameters, and hence symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria are provided. To the best of our knowledge, one-shot Blotto games where the players possess asymmetric information has not received attention in the literature.
In this paper, we formulate a Bayesian game framework in which one player is completely informed and the other does not receive any side information about the battlefield valuations (Section III). Our main contributions characterize unique equilibrium payoffs and strategies in representative scenarios of this framework. We first analyze the Colonel Blotto game with two battlefields (Section IV). With three battlefields, we are able to solve for unique mixed-strategy equilibria in a representative General Lotto game under the same informational asymmetry (Section V). We do this by leveraging established results on all-pay auctions with asymmetric information [20] (Section VI). We can then quantify the difference between the equilibrium payoff in this game and the scenario where both players are uninformed.
These characterizations allow us to determine conditions under which the informed player has an advantage in the Lotto game, despite having fewer resources to allocate. As an illustrative analysis, we consider a scenario where both players are uninformed and the option of purchasing information with a fraction of its budget is available only to the weaker player. We quantify a measure of informational value determined by the largest proportion of resources the player is willing to give up in exchange for information (Section V).
II. MODEL
Two players, I and U , allocate their non-atomic forces across n battlefields simultaneously. In each battlefield j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the player that sends more forces wins the battlefield and receives payoff v j , while the losing player receives −v j . In the case of a tie on a battlefield, both players receive zero payoff. The utility to each player is the sum of payoffs across all battlefields. The players have a budget on their forces, X I , X U > 0. We assume X I < X U . The budgets and battlefield valuations v := {v j } n j=1 are common knowledge. For z ∈ {I, U }, a pure strategy is a non-negative vector x z = (x 1 z , . . . , x n z ) ∈ R n + . We call x z an allocation. The payoff to player z is
where we follow the convention sgn(0) = 0. This defines a zero-sum game since the payoff to player −z is the negative of the above. A mixed strategy for player z is an n-variate distribution function F z on R n + . That is, an allocation x z is drawn from the distribution F z . A distribution F z has n univariate marginal (cumulative) distributions {F j z } n j=1 , specifying the allocation distributions to each battlefield. Extending the definition of (1) to mixed strategies, the expected payoff for each player can be expressed as
(2)
A. The Colonel Blotto game
In the Colonel Blotto game, a feasible allocation x z for player z ∈ {I, U } lies in the set
Furthermore, the support of a mixed strategy F z is contained in B(X z ). Thus, an allocation x z drawn from F z belongs to B(X z ) with probability one. We denote the set of all such feasible mixed strategies with B(X z ). We refer to the Colonel Blotto game with CB(X I , X U , v).
B. The General Lotto game
The General Lotto game relaxes the support constraint in the Colonel Blotto game, requiring each player's allocation budget to be met only in expectation with respect to their marginal distributions. That is,
is the set of such feasible mixed strategies. Note that both the budget constraint (LC) and expected payoff (2) only depend on the univariate marginal distributions and not the joint nvariate distribution F z . Hence, a player's choice amounts to selecting n independent univariate marginals that satisfy (LC). We specify General Lotto game with GL(X I , X U , v).
III. BLOTTO AND LOTTO GAMES WITH ASYMMETRIC

INFORMATION
Using a standard Bayesian games framework, we wish to model a situation in which the battlefield valuations are subject to randomness. Suppose there are m possible sets of battlefield valuations, labeled by the states Ω = {ω 1 , . . . , ω m }. The state ω i is realized with probability p i > 0, and the probability vector p ∈ ∆(Ω) satisfying m i=1 p i = 1 is common knowledge to the players. Given state ω i is realized, battlefield j is worth v j i > 0, and we denote V as the m × n matrix with elements [V ] ij = v j i . We consider the setting where player I observes the true state realization, and player U does not receive any side information about the realization 1 . We call U the "uninformed" player. Specifically, player I has m distinct types T I := {t 1 , . . . , t m }, receiving type t i whenever state ω i is realized. That is, I knows the realization with certainty. We refer to T I as its type space. Player U has a single type, and hence infers the realization (and I's type) according to the common prior p. The information structure is known to both players.
A strategy for player I is a collection of m n-variate
as I's strategy. Player U 's strategy F U is a single n-variate distribution. For the Lotto game, F I (t i ) ∈ L(X I ) for each t 1 , . . . , t m , and F U ∈ L(X U ). For the Blotto game, they belong to B(X I ) and B(X U ), respectively. We denote {F j I (t I )} n j=1 as the univariate marginals of F I (t I ) for each t I ∈ T I , and F j U the univariate marginals of F U . All of these components specify a Lotto or Blotto game with incomplete information, which we denote as GL(X I , X U , V, p) and CB(X I , X U , V, p), respectively. The expected utility of player U is
where with some abuse of notation, we use ω i to refer to the battlefield valuation set in state i. The ex-interim utility for player I, given type t i is the expected pay-
An equivalent BNE condition is that (F * I , F * U ) satisfies the best-response correspondences in ex-ante payoffs, given that
We note that since the underlying complete information game is zero-sum, the games with asymmetric information are also zero-sum with respect to ex-ante utilities (3), (5) . This allows us to speak of a unique equilibrium ex-ante payoff π * I = −π * U of the Blotto and Lotto games with asymmetric information.
IV. COLONEL BLOTTO RESULTS FOR TWO BATTLEFIELDS
In the following structural result, we characterize sufficient conditions on the budget ratio γ := X I X U such that the stronger player U is guaranteed a positive equilibrium payoff regardless of the information asymmetry.
as the prior expected value of battlefield j. Without loss of generality, assume the n battlefields are ordered according to E 1 ≥ E 2 ≥ · · · ≥ E n . For n even, consider player U's deterministic strategy that places 2X I /n to the first n/2 battlefields, and the remaining resources allocated arbitrarily. This guarantees U attains at least half of the total available value. That is, U's security value for this strategy is at least zero. Similar reasoning applies to the case of n odd.
For two battlefields, the weaker resource player I never wins the game, despite having better information. The following analysis focuses on the two battlefield case of CB(X I , X U , V, p) under the uniform prior p = 1 2 1 2 . Although I never wins, we quantify how information improves its payoff relative to when both players are uninformed. A solution for a general prior p = [p, 1−p] remains a challenge in this analysis, due to the complexity of finding suitable equilibrium distributions. Hence for the rest of this section we assume a uniform prior p = 1 2 .
A. Two battlefields case
If X I X U < 1 2 , player U can secure both battlefields regardless of what I does. We thus restrict our attention to the regime X I X U ∈ ( 1 2 , 1). We state the main result of this section, which characterizes the equilibrium payoff to I. Here, we assume a symmetric structure on the battlefields Figure 1a illustrates the setup of this game.
Theorem 1. Let X I X U ∈ ( 1 2 , 1), and assume p = 1 2 . Define q = X U X U −X I . Then the ex-ante equilibrium payoff to the informed player I is
A proof is provided in [1] , which details a set of equilibrium mixed strategies. When both players are uninformed, i.e. both have a single type, we have a complete information game where the two battlefield valuations are their expected values, 1 2 . The equilibrium payoff is then given by an application of Gross and Wagner's solution [9] , which yields π GW I := − 1 q . The following result verifies the equilibrium payoff improves when I obtains information. Corollary 1. We have π * I > π GW I . That is, information strictly improves the equilibrium payoff for I.
We may quantify a value of information in this setting as the payoff difference π * I − π GW I . Settingv = 1 and v = α ∈ (0, 1), we plot the equilibrium values π * I in Figure 1 , as well as the value of information. In the two battlefield Blotto game, an informed player still cannot gain an advantage, as π * I < 0 for all parameters (α, γ) ∈ (0, 1)×(0, 1). Information offers the most payoff improvement when I's budget is low and the minor battlefield α is worth less (Fig. 1c) .
In the next section, we consider the three battlefield case in the General Lotto game. In general, equilibrium solutions for n ≥ 3 heterogeneous battlefields have not been characterized in the Colonel Blotto game, due to the complexity of finding suitable copulas for the marginal distributions [3] . The Lotto constraint relaxation allows for analytic tractability in cases of more than two heterogeneous battlefields [14] .
V. GENERAL LOTTO RESULTS
We restrict our attention to a representative threebattlefield Lotto game GL(X I , X U , V αβ , p), where p =
In each set of battlefields (rows), the total valuation is normalized to one. Though this formulation may be quite specific, the representative game serves as an illustrative and tractable scenario highlighting the informational asymmetry between players. Intuitively, for small α, β values, the valuable battlefield is worth 1 but sits at a different location in each realization. An informed player would be able to take the most advantage by focusing its resources on this battlefield without wasting resources on the other battlefields.
A. Main result: characterization of equilibrium payoff
Theorem 2. Let γ = X I X U ≤ 1. Then player I's equilibrium payoff, π * I (α, β, γ), for α, β, γ ∈ (0, 1) takes the values . Player I has fewer resources than player U, but knows the true realization. (b) The equilibrium payoff (7) to the informed player in the Blotto game CB(XI , XU , V, 1 2 ), wherev = 1 and v = α ∈ (0, 1). It is negative when γ ∈ ( 1 2 , 1) and α ∈ (0, 1). (c) The value of information, π * I − π GW I , is non-negative. Information offers the most improvement for low budget (γ near 1 2 ) and when there is higher priority in the diagonal battlefields (α low). Figure 2a for the special case α = β. We detail our approach to the proof in Section VI, where we draw upon known results in asymmetric information allpay auctions. In particular, we are able to establish that solutions of the Lotto game coincide with solutions of n independent all-pay auctions with asymmetric information. An iterative algorithm formulated in [20] constructs unique mixed equilibrium strategies. The full proof is provided in [1] , which specifies the equilibrium mixed strategies.
B. The value of information in the Lotto game
In the following analysis, we consider a scenario in which both players are uninformed, and the option to purchase information with a fraction of its budget is available to player I. We quantify a value of information as the equilibrium payoff gain or loss in purchasing information, and specify the maximal cost I is willing to pay before it experiences a payoff loss. In the case both players are uninformed, we may use the algorithm of [20] to solve the Lotto game. In this setting, we arrive at the equilibrium payoff γ − 1 for I. We first highlight some immediate consequences of Theorem 2.
Corollary 2. We have that π * I (α, β, γ) > γ−1 for (α, β, γ) ∈ (0, 1) 3 . That is, information strictly improves the equilibrium payoff for I. Additionally, π * I is strictly decreasing in α and β, and strictly increasing in the budget γ.
Proof. The first claim follows from comparing the expressions (8) and (9) to γ − 1. The second claim follows by showing the respective signs of partial derivatives hold.
We also characterize the parameter region in which an informed I wins the game for the special case α = β. Proof. Player I cannot win in the first region γ ∈ (0, 1 3 ], as π * I ≤ 0. We find that the second expression of (8) is equivalent to (9) when β = α. We then solve the equation π * I (α, α, γ) = 0 for α, from which we obtain the result.
We now provide a general quantity of describing the value of information. In particular, we consider a scenario where both players are uninformed. Player I, with the budget ratio γ, has an opportunity to purchase information with a fraction c I of its budget. The value of information quantifies the equilibrium payoff gain or loss in purchasing the information at the budget fraction cost c I . Formally, the value of information is the quantity
An instance of the value of information is plotted in Figure  2b , when the cost is c I = 1 5 . We note there is a regime in which information is not worth the cost, i.e. VoI(α, γ) < 0.
We also seek to find the highest cost on information that I is willing to pay before it experiences an equilibrium payoff loss. To quantify this cost, let γ e be defined as the value that satisfies π * I (α, α, γ e ) = γ − 1. Such a value is unique and well-defined for any α, since π * I (α, α, γ) < γ − 1 and is strictly increasing in γ, by 
where γ e (α, γ) := (c) Fig. 2: (a) The equilibrium payoff π * I to the informed player in the Lotto game GL(XI , XU , V αβ , 1 3 13), under the special case α = β. The dashed line are the points (γ, α) for which π * I = 0. That is, for parameters below the line, the informed player "wins" the game and "loses" for parameters above the line (see Corollary 3). (b) The value of information, or payoff gain or loss to player I from purchasing information at the cost cI = 1 5 . The dashed black line in Figure 2b indicates the parameters for which VoI(α, γ) = 0. (c) The maximal cost (11), or the largest fraction of its resource budget γ that player I is willing to give up in exchange for information before it experiences a payoff loss. Information is more valuable in lower α ranges -when the battlefield rewards are concentrated at diverse locations.
Proof. We solve the equation π * I (α, α, γ e ) = γ − 1 for γ e . Recall the second expression of (8) is equivalent to (9) when β = α. The resulting value is valid only if γ e > 1 3 . If not, we solve for γ e using the first entry of (8).
Figure 2c plots C I (α, γ). As an example, when γ = 1 and α = 0, player I can exchange up to 2 3 of its budget for information and still obtain a payoff greater than γ − 1 = 0. When α is high, player I cannot afford to give up resources. Information is less valuable in this regime.
VI. PROOF OUTLINE OF THEOREM 2
We show the equilibrium profile in the Lotto game GL(X I , X U , V, p) coincides with equilibria of n independent all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and valuations. The work of Siegel [20] provides an iterative algorithm for which to construct equilibrium mixed strategies in the all-pay auction. One can then leverage this procedure to construct the equilibrium strategies in the Lotto game, and verify that they satisfy the constraint (LC). These details and calculations are provided in [1] .
A. Two-player all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and valuations
Here, we specialize the setup of [20] to our setting of an informed player I and an uninformed player U . Assume the two players compete in an all-pay auction over an indivisible good, where the players I and U have the same type spaces as before. When type t i ∈ T I is realized (i ∈ {1, . . . , m}) with probability p i > 0, player I's valuation of the good is ν I (t i ) and player U 's valuation is ν U (t i ). Assume the types in T I are ordered such that ν I (t i ) ≥ ν I (t k ) whenever i < k, i, k ∈ {1, . . . , m}. In the two player all-pay auction with asymmetric information and valuations, player I selects the distributions of bids F I : T I × R + → [0, 1] contingent on its type. We write F I (t i ) to refer to the distribution of bids in type i, F I (t i , x) to refer to its value at x ≥ 0, and f I to refer to its density function. As player U has a single type, it selects a single distribution of bids, F U : R + → [0, 1]. The best-response problems for each player are
An iterative procedure is formulated by Siegel in [20] to construct equilibrium mixed strategies satisfying the correspondences (12) . We note that Siegel's algorithm handles general player information structures in the two-player allpay auction. In this paper, we restrict our attention to its application in our informed-uninformed setting. In particular, the constructed equilibrium marginals are proven to be piecewise constant functions with finite support, with the possibility of having point masses placed at zero. The location of the supports are determined only after the final iteration of the algorithm. We omit further details of the algorithm due to space constraints.
B. Connection of General Lotto to all-pay auctions
In the game GL(X I , X U , V, p), player U 's Lagrangian at both ex-ante and interim levels may be written as
where λ U > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on U's expected budget constraint (LC), and we have removed constant additive and multiplicative terms in the expression that do not depend on the decision variables {F j U } n j=1 . In a similar fashion, player I's Lagrangian maximization at the interim level may be written
where the multiplier λ i I > 0 corresponds to the budget constraint (LC) in type t i . When two sets of battlefields contain the same valuations, we can deduce equivalence between the corresponding Lagrange multipliers. Lemma 1. Consider the game GL(X I , X U , V, p). Suppose the rows i and k of V have the same elements, each with identical multiplicities. Then the equilibrium ex-interim payoff to player I for type t i is equivalent to that of type t k . Furthermore, λ i I = λ k I . A proof is provided in [1] due to space constraints. To solve for a BNE, we write the best-response correspondences at the ex-ante level. Player U's ex-ante best-response problem is given by (13) , while Player I's ex-ante optimization problem may be written
after removing additive constants. Under the conditions λ i I = λ I > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , m (by Lemma 1), each battlefield j is an independent all-pay auction, whose problem is
which coincides with (12) with auction valuations ν U (t i ) = 2v j i λ U and ν I (t i ) = 2v j i pi λ I . Here, we have multiplied each maximization problem of by p i > 0, which does not change the optimal solutions. In this setting, mixed-strategy equilibria of the Lotto game are equivalent to that of n independent two-player all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and valuations.
We may then apply the algorithm of [20] to construct equilibrium distributions F j U and {F j I (t i )} m i=1 for each battlefield j. The constructed distributions are functions of the known parameters as well as the Lagrange multipliers. If there exists unique multipliers λ * I , λ * U > 0 such that the Lotto constraints (LC) are met for all types t I ∈ T I for I and for type t U for U , then it is clear the n constructed strategy profiles constitute a BNE for GL(X I , X U , V, p). Indeed, we have applied the algorithm to obtain a set of distributions, and verified there is a unique λ * I , λ * U > 0 such that (LC) is satisfied. The details of this calculation are outlined in [1] .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we extended the Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games to a setting where players have asymmetric information about the valuations of the battlefields. We focused on the case when one player is completely informed about the valuations but has fewer resources to allocate, and the other player is uninformed. Our analysis on the two battlefield case in the Colonel Blotto game shows an informed player still cannot defeat its opponent in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. We find a three battlefield scenario presents enough complexity such that the informed player in the General Lotto game can attain the advantage for certain parameters.
A direction of future research involves generalizing the connection of the all-pay auctions with asymmetric information to the General Lotto game. This will allow us to investigate General Lotto games where the players hold arbitrary information structures.
